BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CECS - ECPv6.18.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CECS
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://www.cecs.uci.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CECS
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20220313T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20221106T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20230312T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20231105T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20240310T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20241103T090000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230807T110000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20230807T120000
DTSTAMP:20231011T033045Z
CREATED:20231011T032546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231011T033045Z
UID:14162-1691406000-1691409600@www.cecs.uci.edu
SUMMARY:"Capstone: A Capability-based Foundation for Trustless Secure Memory Access"
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Jason Zhijingcheng Yu\nDate and Time: Monday\, August 7th\, 11:00 am \nLocation: EH 2430 \nAbstract: \nCapability-based memory isolation is a promising new architectural primitive. Software can access lowlevel memory only via capability handles rather than raw pointers\, which provides a natural interface to enforce security restrictions. Existing architectural capability designs such as CHERI provide spatial safety but fail to extend to other memory models that security-sensitive software designs may desire. In this paper\, we propose Capstone\, a more expressive architectural capability design that supports multiple existing memory isolation models in a trustless setup\, i.e.\, without relying on trusted software components. We show how Capstone is well-suited for environments where privilege boundaries are fluid (dynamically extensible)\, memory sharing/delegation are desired both temporally and spatially\, and where such needs are to be balanced with availability concerns. Capstone can also be implemented efficiently. We present an implementation sketch and through evaluation show that its overhead is below 50% in common use cases. We also prototype a functional emulator for Capstone and use it to demonstrate the runnable implementations of six real-world memory models without trusted software components: three types of enclave-based TEEs\, a thread scheduler\, a memory allocator\, and Rust-style memory safety—all within the interface of Capstone.\nBiography: \nJason Zhijingcheng Yu is a 4th-year PhD student working with Prof Prateek Saxena at the School of Computing\, National University of Singapore (NUS). He works on operating system and architectural security\, with a focus on trusted computing and capability-based security in architectures. His first-authored work has been published at venues including ACM CCS 2021\, USENIX Security 2022\, and USENIX Security 2023. Homepage: https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~yuz1996/\nHosted By: Zhou Li
URL:https://www.cecs.uci.edu/event/capstone-a-capability-based-foundation-for-trustless-secure-memory-access/
LOCATION:EH 2430\, Engineering Hall\, University of California\, Irvine\, Irvine\, CA\, 92697\, United States
CATEGORIES:Seminars at CECS
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cecs.uci.edu/files/2023/07/Jason-Yu.png
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR